BASEBALL-SPORT OR COMMERCE?*
JoHN EC=Et

EW BUSINESS efforts receive the public attention accorded baseball. Every rhubarb' is given nation-wide consideration; the calcium
deposit on the heel of a quasi-peon2 becomes the object of universal
concern. The country's greatest metropolitan dailies and its smallest biweekly newspapers invariably contain sport pages which dedicate themselves to the reporting of the minutest detail of every game, trade, or development in the sport of baseball. It is familiar scheduling for radio stations to provide fifteen minutes for news of the world, followed by an equal
period of baseball news. As a result of such coverage, almost everyone has
a fairly intimate knowledge of baseball.
In significant contrast to this familiarity with the play of the game is the
lack of familiarity with "baseball law," the self-imposed body of regulations under which "organized baseball"' regulates its activity. The Agree4
ment of the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues,
adopted in i9oi "to perpetuate baseball as the national game of America,
and to surround it with such safeguards as will warrant absolute public
confidence in its integrity and methods," S together with the Major League
Agreement,6 the Major-Minor League Agreement, 7 and the rules promulgated thereunder, comprise "baseball law." Because of faithful adherence
to the dictates of its own rules, "organized baseball" has had few excur* Subsequent to the preparation of this article it has been reported that Max Lanier and
Fred Martin have decided to drop their suit against "organized baseball" which is discussed
herein. N.Y. Times, § 5, P. I, col. 2 (Aug. 28, 1949).
f* Member of the Ohio Bar.
I A term used by sports writers to describe an altercation, more or less intense in nature,
between participants on a baseball field.
2 A term used by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to describe a young athlete
who receives a base pay ranging from $5,ooo to $ioo,ooo for each baseball playing season of
five and one-half months. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F. 2d 402, 410 (1949).
3"Organized baseball" connotes the integrated system of baseball comprised of the two
major leagues and the so-called minor leagues described more fully later in this paper. The
players are "professional" in that they are paid salaries. Many other teams and leagues, often
called "semi-professional," are composed of players some or all of whom are paid and, therefore, are in reality "professional."
The Baseball Blue Book 701 et seq. (1948).
s National Association Agreement § 2.01 (a), The Baseball Blue Book 7o (1948).
4

6The Baseball Blue Book soi (1948).

7Ibid., at 6oi.
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sions into the courts, and reported decisions are practically devoid of any
reference to baseball.8 This tranquillity, however, has been abruptly interrupted. The entire framework of the law of "organized baseball" has been
challenged twice recently as illegal under the Sherman and Clayton Acts,9
and that challenge has been given a substantial "assist" by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in its remarkable decision in Gardella v.
Chandler.1°
I. GARDELLA, MARTIN, AND LA iER
In the spring of T946 the owners of baseball interests in Mexico undertook to hire for their teams certain players who were under contract to
play for teams operating within the framework of "organized baseball."
Among the players who responded to the enticing offers to go south were
Daniel Gardella, an outfielder with the New York Giants, and Fred
Martin and Max Lanier, pitchers with the St. Louis Cardinals. Those
three players, along with several others who also "jumped" their contracts
to play in Mexico, were immediately placed on a so-called "ineligible list"
by Commissioner Chandler and barred for a period of five years from participation in "organized baseball" in accordance with the express provision
of the Major League Rules" which had been specifically incorporated in
each player's contract.- The attraction of Mexican baseball apparently
proved to be more illusory than real, for most of the players who "jumped"
to Mexico have not returned to that country. Gardella, Martin, and Lanier, plaintiffs in the pending actions against certain officials and teams in
"organized baseball,' 3 following their abortive careers in Mexico, have
returned to the United States. Since their return they have engaged in
2 Baseballhas from time to time received the attention of legal periodicals: Topkis, Monopoly in Professional Sports, 58 Yale L.J. 69z (:949); Neville, Basebal and the Antitrust Laws,
16 Fordham L. Rev. 208 (1947); Baseballand the Law-Yesterday and Today, 32 Va. L. Rev.
1164 (1946); Organized Baseball and the Law,

19

Notre Dame Lawyer

262

(1944); Johnson,

Baseball Law, 73 U.S.L. Rev. 252 (1939); Organized Baseball and the Law, 46 Yale L.J. 1386
('937).
9 26 Stat, 209 (i8go), i5 U.S.C.A. § i et seq. (94).
'D172 F. 2d 402 (C.A. 2d, 1949).
rr Rule 15, Major League Agreement, The Basebal Blue Book 530 (1948).
12 Uniform Players Contract
9(a): "The Club and the Player agree to accept, abide by
and comply with all provisions of the Major and Major-Minor League Rules which concern
player conduct and player-dub relationships and with all decisions of the Commissioner and
the President of the Club's League, pursuant thereto."
13 Gardella has filed suit against Chandler, Commissioner; Frick and Harridge, Presidents
of the National and American Leagues, respectively; Trautman, President of the National
Association (minor leagues); and the New York Giants Club. Martin and Lanier are more
ambitious. They have sued the same individuals, and, in addition, all sixteen clubs of the
major leagues.
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professional baseball,14 but, because of their suspensions, they were for a
time denied an opportunity to play on a team associated with "organized
baseball." Recently,15 "to temper justice with mercy," Commissioner
Chandler "lifted" the suspension, and Gardella, Martin, and Lanier, as
well as all the other players who went to Mexico, have been given permission to return to "organized baseball." The Commissioner's action
does not affect any possible rights of the plaintiffs that may have accrued
prior to the lifting of the suspensions, and their counsel have announced
that the reinstatement will have no effect on the pending cases.
None of the players denies that in "jumping" to Mexico he breached the
express terms of his contract with his club, the penalty for which was
suspension from "organized baseball." They premise their action upon the
allegation that the contracts are illegal because they serve to effect an
illegal restraint of trade or commerce and to promote an illegal monopoly
over trade or commerce in contravention of Sections i, 2, and 3 of the
Sherman Act and of Section 4 of the Clayton Act. To the extent that these
sections are relevant to the pending actions, they are set out in the footnotes.' 6(
The particular provision of the player's contract considered most offensive and directly calculated to effect the alleged monopoly is the so-called
"reserve clause."' 17 Under this provision each player gives his present club
14 Supporting affidavits filed by Martin and Lanier with their complaint. Martin and Lanier
are playing this year, the 1949 season, with the Quebec Professional League. Martin is with the
Sherbrooke Club and Lanier is with the Drummondville Club earning a reported $o,ooo for
season's play. The Sporting News, p. 32, col. 2 (June I, 1949). Now that their suspension has
been lifted, they are back in "organized baseball."

ISJune s, 1949.

16Sherman Act: "Section i.... Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal....
"Section 2.... Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of amisdemeanor....
"Section 3.... Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District of
Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and another, or
between any such Territory or Territories and any State or States or the District of Columbia,
or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign
nations, is declared illegal." 26 Stat. 209 (i8go), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-3 (r94i).
Clayton Act: "Section 4.... Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three fold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 38 Stat. 731 (1941), I5
U.S.C.A. § 15 (1941).
17 Uniform Player's Contract
io(a).
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or its assignee an option for his services for the succeeding year. Although,
as Gardella quite frankly admits in his complaint, "the ultimate objective
of this clause was to equalize the opportunities for each team representing
a particular city or part thereof to win the pennant and thus to keep alive
the interest of its supporters,"' 8 it is nevertheless maintained that the universal use of contracts containing this reservation empowers "organized
baseball" to control playing talent in violation of the federal mandate
against restraints of trade and commerce. The plaintiffs allege that the
asserted conspiracy of "organized baseball" to restrain trade and commerce among the states and its concerted action to monopolize the baseball profession has resulted in their personal damage. Martin and Lanier
have stated their treble damages as being $i,ooo,ooo and $i,5oo,ooo, respectively; Gardella places his at $3oo,ooo.
To be sure, the complaints of the plaintiffs have not been confined to a
mere recital of the players' contracts and the reserve clause therein, but in
considerable detail have discussed numerous provisions of the agreements
comprising "baseball law," the apparent arbitrary power reposing in the
Commissioner of Baseball to enforce discipline thereunder, the mechanical
operations by which baseball teams move from city to city to meet their
scheduled games, and particularly the more recent practice of broadcasting and televising games. The rationale of the plaintiffs' cases remains,
however, that these players, because of their violation of provisions of
their contracts, 9 have, under the rules of "baseball law," been deprived
of an opportunity to practice their profession in "organized baseball," and
that the concerted effort of "organized baseball" in the creation and enforcement of those rules is a "conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States. ' '2 °
II. THE FEDERAL CASE
The Gardella case and the Martin and Lanier case, although not yet
disposed of, have been the object of considerable judicial attention. The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Gardellaaction on the ground that
the plaintiff had failed to- state a cause of action. The district court
agreed2l and granted the defendants' motion on the grounds that Federal
is Gardella complaint 53.
19Gardella had not signed his 1946 contract, but went off to Mexico in violation of the "reserve clause" in his 1945 contract-that he would play with the Giants or their assignee in
1946. Martin and Lanier had signed their 1946 contracts, and were playing and drawing pay
thereunder. They left for Mexico on May 26, 1946, when Lanier had the enviable pitching record of five victories against no defeats.
20 Sherman Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (i89o), 15 U.S.C.A. § i (1941).
2 Gardella v. Chandler, 79 F. Supp. 26o (N.Y., 1948).
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Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs2 was still the law, and that the federal anti-trust laws were not
applicable to the operation of "organized baseball."
The FederalBaseball Club decisions was handed down in a case which
presented the only other serious challenge to the legality of the pattern
established over the years by "organized baseball." There a similar raid
had been made in 1914 on players under contract with clubs operating in
"organized baseball" by interests in this country who were intent on creating a "third major league." When that effort proved unsuccessful, the
Baltimore club of the short-lived Federal League claimed damages which
it asserted were experienced because "organized baseball" had conspired
to monopolize the baseball business in violation of the Sherman Act. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held for the defendants.24
The United States Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Justice Holmes,
speaking for a unanimous Court, concluded that the business involved was
that of giving exhibitions of baseball, "which are purely state affairs. 12S
In addition, the decision held that baseball was not "commerce." The
Court acknowledged that the teams played in different states and that
men and equipment necessarily had to cross state lines, but said: "That to
which it [interstate transportation] is incident, the exhibition, although
made for money, would not be called trade or commerce in the commonly
accepted use of those words. As it is put by the defendant, personal effort,
not related to production, is not a subject of commerce. That which, in its
consummation, is not commerce, does not become commerce among the
6
States because the transportation that we have mentioned takes place.'
In the twenty-seven years since that decision, the details of "baseball
law" have been the subject of constant revision, but the game remains
identical in all its major aspects-three strikes are still an "out," the
Brooklyn Dodgers still travel to St. Louis to play the Cardinals, the dubs
still carry balls and bats over state lines, and peanuts are still sold in the
stands.

III.

GARDELLA V. CHANDLER

It has been the general consensus of opinion of persons both in and out
of baseball that the Federal case disposed of the issue with respect to the
- 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
24National League of Professional

269 Fed. 681

23 Ibid.

Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,

(1920).

2s Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922).

Ibid.,

at

209.
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character of the game, and that, since baseball was deemed not to be "interstate trade or commerce," it did not come within the ambit of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
as recently as 1947, expressly followed the Federal case, but now it would
seem as if "organized baseball" is to be regarded as having changed its
''
"spots.

27 Two judges concluded that the judgment of the district court

should be reversed and the cause remanded for trial on the complaint; one
decided the district court's judgment should be affirmed. Each judge wrote
a separate opinion.
Judge Chase reached the decision that the judgment below should be
affirmed upon the grounds that (i) the Federal case was controlling and
(2) that, even if that decision could be distinguished, Gardella had not
stated a cause of action.28 The judge found that the Holmes decision had
never been reversed, that subsequent decisions had not overruled it by
implication, and that the facts now before the court were indistinguishable
from those considered by the Court in the Federalcase. Commenting on
the plaintiff's allegation that baseball games are now broadcast and televised, a development since the Federalcase which proved so persuasive to
the other two members of the court, judge Chase observed that the record
of the Federal case revealed that at the time of that decision "play-byplay" was sent over telegraph wires, and that now the same "information
is sent through the air by impulses which are transformed either into
words or pictures. So far as I can perceive, the difference in the method of
transmission is without significance.

29

As a second ground for his decision, judge Chase concluded that, irrespective of the binding effect of the Federalcase, personal services and
skills are not subjects of trade or commerce within the anti-trust laws.
Therefore, Gardella's allegation that the alleged conspiracy had deprived
him of a right to work shoots wide of the mark.3° The Sherman Act, this
opinion holds, has never been applied unless "there was some form of restraint upon commercial competition in the marketing of goods and services in interstate commerce. . .. ,,31
In that connection, judge Chase
27 Conley v. San Carlo Opera Co., 163 F. 2d 3io (C.C.A. 2d, 1947); Gardella v. Chandler,
172 F. 2d 3io (C.A. 2d, 1949).
28Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F. 2d 402, 404 (C.A. 2d, 1949).
29Ibid.
30 Ibid., at 407. In this connection it may be noted that the Supreme Court has made distinctions between restraints upon interstate commerce transactions and restraints imposed
in the course of interstate labor disputes. See United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S.
293, 297 (1945), and, at a lower court level, United Brick &Clay Workers of America v. Robinson Clay Products Co., 64 F. Supp. 872 (Ohio, 1946).

31Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F. 2d

402,

4o6 (1949).
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quoted from the opinion of Justice Stone in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader:
In the cases considered by this Court since the StandardOil case in iixi some form
of restraint of commercial competition has been the sine qua non to the condemnation
of contracts, combinations or conspiracies under the Sherman Act, and in general
restraints upon competition have been condemned only when their purpose or effect
was to raise or fix the market price. It is in this sense that it is said that the restraints,
actual or intended, prohibited by the Sherman Act, are only those which are so substantial as to affect market prices.32
Judge Learned Hand took what might be considered an intermediate
position between that of Judge Chase and Judge Frank. Because the complaint alleged that the sale of radio and television rights had indelibly
impressed upon the sport of baseball a characteristic substantially different from that which was before the Supreme Court in the Federal case,
Judge Hand decided that the plaintiff should have an opportunity to
prove his assertions at a trial.
It may be asserted unequivocally that Judge Frank, in his opinion, did
not take an intermediate position. In his first sentence he branded the
Holmes decision in Federal Baseball Club v. National League3 as an "impotent zombi,' 34 but concluded that nevertheless it was a decision with
which the court must reckon. Thereupon, in a statement which is commendable for its candor but which, nonetheless, reflects on the judicial
temperament, he stated that the Gardellacase should be distinguished, if
possible, from the Federal decision. The reason ascribed for this eager
search for a means of placing the brand of illegality on "organized baseball" was that "we have here a monopoly which, in its effect on ballplayers like the plaintiff, possesses characteristics shockingly repugnant to
moral principles that, at least since the War Between the States, have been
basic in America, as shown by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, condemning 'involuntary servitude,' and by subsequent Congres' 35
sional enactments on that subject.'
The Federalcase had decided that the playing of a ball game was intrastate activity. For that reason, then, the players' contracts, good or bad,
related to intrastate activity. The Frank opinion proceeds on the theory
that if the game can be found to be interstate, then the players' contracts
relate to interstate activity, and if bad (and Judge Frank has no question
in his mind on that score) they violate the Sherman Act.
32310

U.S. 469, 500 (1940).

34 172

F. 2d 402, 409 (x949). Because of the adjective "impotent" used by the Judge we can

33 259 U.S. 200 (1922).

assume he employed "zombi" to mean "the walking dead" rather than the alcoholic beverage
by the same name.
3s Ibid. Now it would seem that the "national pastime" is "un-American."
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The ingredient grasped upon by Judge Frank to prove the present interstate aspect of "organized baseball" in contradistinction to the situation which existed at the time of the Federalcase was the frequent broadcast of baseball games by radio and television. Because of this activity, the
decision says, the games "are, so to speak, played interstate as well as
intra-state. ' '1 6 It was conceded that the question was one of degree, but to
resolve that difficult issue it was said: "However, to the question whether
the difference between a difference of kind and difference of degree is itself
a difference of degree or of kind, the sage answer has been given that it is a
difference of degree, but a 'violent' one. ' ' 37 In final testimony to the dif-

ficulties of this tail-wags-the-dog point of view-that the sport of baseball,
as it has operated for more than fifty years, is illegal because recently its
games have been broadcast-stands what seems to be the fairly strained
assumption upon which Judge Frank based his decision: "I think we
must, for purposes of deciding the applicability of the Sherman Act, consider this case as if the only audiences for whom the games are played
consist of those persons who, in other states, see, hear, or hear about, the
games via television and radio." 38
IV. MARTnN AND LANIER V. CHAmDLER

On June 2d of this year, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
speaking through Judge Learned Hand, filed an opinion in a proceeding
which it denominated a "sequel" to its decision in the Gardella case. 39
Motions had been filed in both the Gardella and Martin and Lanier cases
for injunctions pendente lite to compel the defendants to remove the plaintiffs' suspensions and to reinstate them to the "eligible" list. The motions
were denied by the judge of the district court on three grounds. "First, he
held that the injunction would 'disturb the status quo by restoring the
plaintiffs to positions which they had voluntarily resigned three years
36 Ibid.,

at

411.

37 bid., at 412.

' Tbid., at 414. The thoroughness and zeal with which Judge Frank has pursued his mission is indicated by his footnote number ga. Ibid., at 45. There he suggests an accounting
technique to be used by plaintiff in the trial of his case. The "broadcast theory" will, of course,
be met with the argument that while the sale of radio and television rights is a valuable asset,
it in no sense controls or determines any aspect of the baseball undertaking. In anticipating
that argument, the footnote seems to admit the argument's validity by calling income from
that source "velvet." Nonetheless, Judge Frank would have that income compared to net
profits rather than gross profits in order that it Miay be shown to be more than "trifling." This
procedure seems to be not only bad accounting, but inconsistent with the theory of his decision.
If, because of radio and television, baseball has become interstate, then certainly income from
that source must be lumped with and considered in relation to income from baseball's intrastate activity. Compare Judge Hand's opinion in Martin and Lanier v. Chandler, 174 F. 2d
917 (C.A. 2d, 1949).
39 Martin and Lanier v. Chandler, 174 F. 2d 917 (C.A. 2d, 1949).
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before'; second, he held that their rights depended upon disputed questions of fact and law; third, he held that they had an adequate remedy of
' °
law in the recovery of damages. ' 4
In affirming the decision of the district court, judge Learned Hand
wrote a short but significantly unanimous opinion. Of the three grounds,
the court found it necessary to consider only the second ground, that the
plaintiff's rights depended on disputed questions of fact and law. While
briefly analyzing the court's opinion in the Gardella case, judge Hand
amplified his own position and, on the intrastate vs. interstate issue, said:
"It seemed to me that it was [in the.Federalcase] a question of the proportion of the interstate activities to the whole business and that the new
activities of radio broadcasting and television should be added to the
earlier interstate activities and the sum should be compared with the
business as a whole."' 4 The court had before it the controversial "reserve
clause" (which is set out in full later in this article) and in reference to it
said: "Apart from the question of jurisdiction, we are not prepared to say,
on the record now before us, the 'reserve clause' violates the Anti-Trust
Acts. Such a determination may involve consideration, among other
things, of the needs and conduct of the business as a whole. ' ' 42 judge
43
Frank did not dissent.
As has been indicated, at the time of this writing neither the Gardella
case nor the Martin and Lanier case has been tried on the facts. Irrespective of the outcome of those trials, it seems likely that at least the Gardella
case will finally be argued before the United States Supreme Court unless,
of course, legislation makes moot the issues. 44 In light of the encouragement he has received from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the
4o Tbid., at gi8.

4' Tbid., at 918.

421bid., at g18.

43The court did not file a separate opinion in Gardella's action for an injunction pendentelite but affirmed the district court's denial of the injunction by a per curiam opinion citing as
authority its discussion in the Martin and Lanier case. Gardella v. Chandler, i74 F. 2d gig
(C.A. 2d, I949).
44 Two identical bills have been introduced in the 8ist Congress: H.R. 4o8 and H.R. 4oi9,
which provide: "That section 313 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, is amended

by inserting "(a)" after "313. ' And by adding at the end of such section the following new
subsection:
"(b) No organized professional sports enterprise shall by reason of radio or television broadcasts of sports exhibitions, or by reason of other activities related to the conduct of such enterprise, be held to be engaged in trade or commerce among the several States, Territories, and
the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or in activities affecting such trade or commerce, within the meaning of any law of the United States relating to unlawful restraints and
monopolies or to combination, contracts, or agreements, in restraint of trade or commerce."
It seems unlikely that these, or bills designed to have the same effect, will be pressed for
action until the pending cases have reached final decision.
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plaintiff is not likely to yield; "organized baseball" has at stake its entire
structure.
V. TRADE oR ComL

cE?

Gardella, Martin, and Lanier seek damages under the anti-trust laws.
In order to bring "organized baseball" within the purview of those laws,
two fundamental questions must be answered in the affirmative. (i) Is
baseball an interstate activity? (2) Is baseball trade or commerce?
The new element which the plaintiff asserts has been added since the
Federal case, the broadcast of the play of the games,43 goes only to the
answer to question number one: whether or not "organized baseball" is an
intrastate or interstate activity.46 The Supreme Court, indeed, did hold in
the Federal case that the business of baseball was giving exhibitions, a
"purely state affair,"a4 but assuming arguendo that it is found that selling
the right to broadcast does in some way place an interstate aspect on the
game, the second fundamental question still remains-is baseball "trade
or commerce"?
To state the question thus simply compels a negative answer. "Trade or
commerce" inexorably connotes activities of the market place-the
buying or selling of a commodity. In answer to those who would conspire
to restrain the flow of goods to the market place or who would attempt to
monopolize the supply of such goods, with the objective in both instances
to fix or raise the price to the consumer, Congress passed the Sherman Act.
The meaning of the words "trade or commerce" and the abuse at which
the anti-trust laws are directed have been analyzed and stated by the
Supreme Court in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader: "Restraints in competition
or on the course of trade in the merchandising of articles moving in interstate commerce is not enough, unless the restraint is shown to have or is
intended to have an effect upon prices in the market or otherwise to deprive
purchasersor consumers of the advantageswhich they derivefromfree competition."*8 (Italics added.) As judge Chase put it, dissenting in the Gardella
45Gardella Complaint,

30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36. Martin and Lanier Complaint,
32.
46In a recent Sherman Act case, Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,
334 U.S. 219 (1948), the Court seems to have established a new intrastate frontier for the antitrust laws. There refiners of sugar purchased sugar beets, raised and delivered in refiners'
state. Because the ultimate act, the sale of the refined sugar, was admittedly an interstate
transaction, the Court ruled the whole process was given an interstate character and the
Sherman Act covered the preliminary step, the purchase of sugar beets. The reverse situation
is presented by baseball, where the ultimate act, production of the ball game, is an intrastate
activity, and the preliminary or ancillary activity is alleged to be interstate.

47 Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922).
48310

U.S. 469, 5oo (194o).
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case, "The Supreme Court has never, so far as I know, applied the Sherman Act in any case unless it was of the opinion that there was some form
of restraint upon commercial competition in the marketing of goods and
services in interstate commerce. .... -49
By no standard, however elastic, can baseball be considered such "trade
or commerce." On the contrary, baseball is a sport, an athletic contest.
The function and purpose of "organized baseball" as such, is to provide
for, regulate, maintain and discipline such sporting event. The essence of
baseball is the game; the essence of the game is the personal, physical
efforts of the players in that game. "Trade or commerce" is not involved.
There is no production of goods or services which have any effect on either
intrastate or interstate commerce. As the appellees in the Federal case
argued: "Playing baseball, whether for money or not, is a striking instance
of human skill exerted for its own sake and with no relation to production.
In the case of an exhibition of athletic skill, as in the case of dramatic performance, the onlookers derive nothing but enjoyment."50
The rationale of the Federal case is that baseball is not trade or commerce, and it is submitted that the court's decision would have been quite
the same had the facts shown that every ball park was located on a state
line and the players had to pass from one state to another as they ran from
first to second base. Justice Holmes said that "the decision of the court of
appeals went to the root of the case."'I The lower court had said that "the
game effects no exchange of things according to the meaning of 'trade or
''
commerce' as defined above. s2
It is believed that only two other decisions have determined specifically
the question as to whether or not baseball is "trade or commerce." One of
them, American Baseball Club of Chicagov. Chase,5 3 contains little language
to cheer the officials of "organized baseball," and a large portion of it was
found by judge Frank to be useful in support of his quasi-peon theory of
ballplayer servitude5 4 When called upon, however, to resolve the argument that "organized baseball" was subject to the Sherman Act because
it was "trade or commerce," the court there said:
49 172 F. 2d 402, 406 (C.A. 2d, 1949).
so Brief of Defendants in Error, Federal case, p. 47.

5, Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922).
5National

League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,

Fed. 681, 685 (1920).
S3 86 N.Y. Misc. 44r, 149 N.Y. Supp. 6 (1914).
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,

54

Gardella v. Chandler,

172

F. 2d 402, 410 (C.A. 2d, 1949).

BASEBALL-SPORT OR COMMERCE?

67

...
I cannot agree to the proposition that the business of baseball for profits is interstate trade or commerce, and therefore subject to the provisions of the Sherman Act.
An examination of the cases cited by the defendant confirms rather than changes my
conclusion. Commerce is defined by the Century Dictionary as an "interchange of
goods, merchandise or property of any kind; trade, traffic; used more especially of
trade on a large scale carried on by transportation of merchandise between different
countries, or between different parts of the same country, distinguished as foreign
commerce and internal commerce."
The defendant urges that under the National Agreement baseball players are
bought and sold and dealt in among the several States, and are thus reduced and commercialized into commodities. A commodity is defined as: "That which is useful; anything that is useful or serviceable; particularly an article of merchandise; anything
moveable that is a subject of trade or of acquisition."
We are not dealing with the bodies of the players as commodities or articles of
merchandise, but with their services as retained or transferred by contract. The foundation of the National Agreement is the game of baseball conducted as a profitable
business, and if this game were a commodity or an article of merchandise and transported from State to State, then the argument of the defendant's counsel might be
applicable....
Baseball is an amusement, a sport, a game that comes clearly within the civil and
criminal law of the State, and is not a commodity or an article of merchandise subject
to the regulation of Congress on the theory that it is interstate commerce.5s

More recently, the court in AnericanLeague Baseball Club of New York

v. Pasquels6 was confronted with the question of whether or not baseball
was trade in relation to a New York statute. There the court said: "Organized baseball has been in existence for many decades. The plaintiff's activities involve the rendition of services. Even if organized baseball, as
claimed by defendants, be a monopoly, it would seem that it is not a combination in restraint of trade, either under the provision of Section 340 of
the General Business Law, known as the Donnelly Act, or at common
law.,,157

Although, in this era of pragmatic thinking, considerations of legislative
intent,"s like the principle of stare decisis59 and the issue of federal constitutionality, ° have lost much of their weight as precepts for judicial construc"86 N.Y. Misc. 441,

x49

s6 187 N.Y. Misc. 230, 63
s7

N.Y. Supp. 6 (1914).
N.Y.S. 2d 537 (1946).

Ibid., at 54o. See American League Baseball Club of New York v. Pasquel, 188 N.Y.

Misc. io6, 66 N.Y.S. 2d 743 (1946).

ss United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), where the Court,
divided four and four, extended the Sherman Act to cover insurance in spite of "overwhelming" evidence of congressional intent to the contrary. See dissenting opinion of Justice
Frankfurter. Ibid., at 583.
s9 Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Church, 335 U.S. 632 (z949); Spiegel v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
6oCompare Helvering v. Davis, 3oi U.S. 6rg, 64o (rg37).
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tion, to the extent that the will of the citizens of the country expressed
through the acts of their elected representatives is controlling, it settles
this issue. Twenty-seven years ago the Supreme Court ruled that baseball
was not "trade or commerce." Since that time both major political parties
have at different times had incontestable control of both houses of the
national legislature, yet no effort has been made by legislative fiat to bring
6
baseball under the Sherman Act. '
On the issues presented by the pending cases it can be affirmatively
stated that Congress has, in fact, expressed itself. The rationale of the
plaintiffs' cases is not that "organized baseball" is in the television business and that they are damaged because the defendants refuse to show
their pictures, but rather that they are baseball players and are being deprived of an opportunity of exercising their efforts in the play of the game.
The finding of fact upon which Congress premised the exemption of unions
from the anti-trust laws is that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce."12 To be sure the pending actions do not
involve any issues of labor unions and the Sherman Act, but the finding by
Congress that the ability to work is not a subject of trade or commerce is
pertinent.6 3Manifestly, if baseball is not "trade or commerce" under Section i of the Sherman Act, 6 4 it is not trade or commerce which is subject
to a monopoly condemned by Section 2.6s
VI. BASEBALL LAW: REASONABLE OR UNREASONABLE?

Of considerable significance in the disposal of the pending cases will be
the question as to whether or not the restraint alleged by the plaintiffs is,
in fact, unreasonable. That "organized baseball" has imposed restraints
upon itself and all associated with it cannot be gainsaid-that is the very
essence of "baseball law." To be condemned, however, those restraints
must be unreasonable. Justice Brandeis stated the rule of law in Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States:
... But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so
simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade,
every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
6
1 And the President gives the game executive sanction by continuing the practice of throwing out the first ball at the season's start-with either his right or his left hand.
6Clayton

Act § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), i5 U.S.C.A. § 17 (1941).
v. Chandler, 172 F. 2d 402, 406 (C.A. 2d, 1949).

63 Gardella
64 26
6S 26

Stat. 209 (i8go), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1941).
Stat. 209 (i8go), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (194).
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destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before
and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or
the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and
to predict consequences....

"Organized baseball" is composed of two major leagues, the National
and American, both nonprofit, unincorporated associations composed of
eight teams each. The corporations operating the teams are organized for
profit under the laws of the several states. Inaddition to the major leagues
are the so-called minor leagues, composed of clubs in various classifications
designated as AAA, AA, A, 'B, C, and D. These classifications are based
upon the aggregate population of the cities composing the league 67 and
determine, for instance, the number of players a team in a given classification may carry 68 and the monthly salary limit for each club as a whole.64
The leagues and the teams which compose them have entered into
various agreements to regulate the conduct of "organized baseball" and
the play during each league's championship season and any post-season
competitions such as the "World Series." These agreements, three in number, compose "baseball law."
The "Major League Agreement" 70 executed by the two major leagues
and their sixteen constituent clubs, and the rules promulgated thereunder,
relate specifically to the conduct of the major leagues. That agreement
creates the office of Commissioner, and gives the Commissioner broad
powers to investigate, determine, and discipline conduct found to be
"detrimental to the best interests of the national game of baseball." 7'
Such discipline may be by way of fine, suspension, or "such other steps as
he [the Commissioner] may deem necessary and proper in the interest of
the morale of the players and the honor of the game."' 72
Other business communities have never ceased to be amazed at the
degree of unbridled power those representing baseball interests have voluntarily surrendered to the Commissioner. The explanation lies in the
long history of the game. The very nature of a sports enterprise requires
66246 U.S. 231 (1917).
6
7 National

Association Agreement § IO.02(a), The Baseball Blue Book 710 (1948).
68National Association Agreement § 17.02, The Baseball Blue Book 728 (948).
69 Nafional Association Agreement § i8o.o4, The Baseball Blue Book 730 (1948).
70The Baseball Blue Book soi (948).
71 Major League Agreement Art. I, § 2(a), The Baseball Blue Book 507 (948).
7 Major League Agreement Art. I, § 4, The Baseball Blue Book S02 (948).
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submission by those competing to the "rules of the game." That has been
the characteristic pattern of baseball since its inception. The need of selfdiscipline and regulatory control of those within the framework of "organized baseball" was underlined in 1919 when certain interests entirely
independent of "organized baseball" approached players in an effort to
"influence" the outcome of the World Series of that year. Baseball itself
discovered and revealed what has been popularly known as the "Black
Sox Scandal."
Regular avenues of law enforcement had proved inadequate to protect
the integrity of the game. "Organized baseball" concluded that it could
and would keep its own house in order so that it might properly command
the respect of a sports-loving nation. It was then that the office of Commissioner was created. A federal judge, Kenesaw Mountain Landis, whose
courage and integrity were exemplary, stepped down from the bench to
assume that office. Following his death, a United States Senator, Albert B.
Chandler, resigned that public trust to assume the responsibilities of the
office of Commissioner. The power the Commissioner exercises over ownership and players alike is, in many respects, absolute, but the sports community of the country knows and appreciates that "organized baseball" is
entitled to command its unquestioned confidence and respect.
In addition to establishing the office of Commissioner, the Major
League Agreement and Rules provide in meticulous detail the regulations
under which the major leagues operate. A player limit of twenty-five is
established; prohibitions against the signing of high-school and American
Legion Junior players are provided; rules for selection of players in order
that a capable player will not be held in the minor leagues, and waiver
rules which prevent a player being transferred from a major to a minor
league, are stated; a minimum salary for players of $5,000 is established;
the right to own stock in a competing club is denied; rules against misconduct which prohibit and penalize the throwing of games, gifts to umpires and gambling are included; and regulations affecting the World
Series are defined. 73 These are a very few of the detailed provisions of the
Agreement and Rules.
Under the Major-Minor League Agreement and Rules thereunder,7 4 the
minor leagues agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner, and
in the agreement the major and minor leagues defined the rules for the
conduct of those leagues.
73 Major League Rules 2(a) and (b), 3 (i), 3(i), 5(a)-(f), 1o, 17(d), 2o(a)-(e), 21, 33-50.
The Baseball Blue Book 5o8, 512-4, 531-34, 539 (1948).
74 The

Baseball Blue Book 6oi et seq. (1948).

BASEBALL-SPORT OR COMMERCE?

The third agreement, rounding out "baseball law," is the National Association Agreement.75 This document creates the office of President of the
National Association, now occupied by George M. Trautman, and gives to
that office many of the powers of discipline over minor leagues reposed in
the Commissioner over the majors. This agreement establishes rules for
the conduct of the minor leagues.
Rule 3 A of the Major-Minor League Rules provides:
To preserve morale and to produce the similarity of conditions necessary to keen
competition, the contracts between all clubs and their players in the Major League
shall be in a single form which shall be prescribed by the Major League Executive
Council; and the contract between all clubs and players in the Minor Leagues shall be
in a single form which shall be prescribed by the President of the Natiohal Association.
No club shall make a contract different from the uniform contract, and no club shall
make a contract containing a non-reserve clause except permission be first secured from
the Major League Executive Council in case of a Major League player, or from the
President of the National Association in case of a Minor League player. The making of
any agreement between a club and a player not embodied in the contract shall subject
both parties to discipline; and no such agreement, whether written or verbal, shall be
recognized or enforc d.7
Rule 3(a) of the Major League Rules7 7 and Section 15.o of the National
Association Agreement 78 contain similar language.
Each such "uniform contract" incorporates, by reference, the MajorMinor League Agreement and Rules and either the National Association
Agreement or Major League Agreement, as the case may be,7 and requires
the signatories' assent to all decisions of the Commissioner of Baseball.
Thus, the Uniform Player's Contract becomes the instrumentality by
which the players assent to and become regulated by "baseball law."
The court of appeals in the Gardella case did not attempt to analyze
the player's contract as such. Although Judge Frank made some fairly
harsh observations about the contracts, the court did not have before it
the text of the contract and the rules incorporated therein, or any evidence
as to the purpose, operation and effect of the contract and rules as bearing
upon the reasonableness of the restraints contained in them.', It is likely,
however, that considerable attention will be given to its terms and provisions in the trial of the case. Of particular interest will be the "reserve
clause" and the power of the dub to assign a player's contract.
at 701 et seq.
7 1bid., at 6o9.
7sIbid.,
6

77Ibid., at 5o8.
78Ibid., at 7x9.

79 Minor League Contract § 7a; Major League Contract § 9a.
S Compare the same court's comments in Martin and Lanier v. Chandler, 174 F. 2d 917
(C.A. 2d, 1949).
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VII. ThE RESERVE CLAUSE
The paragraph providing for renewal, or the "reserve clause," in the
current major-league Uniform Player's Contract provides:
io. (a) On or before February ist (or if a Sunday, then the next preceding business
day) of the year next following the last playing season covered by this contract, the
Club may tender to the Player a contract for the term of that year by mailing the same
to the Player at his address following his signature hereto, or if none be given, then at
his last address of record with the Club. If prior to the March i next succeeding said
February r, the Player and the Club have not agreed upon the terms of such contract,
then on or before io days after said March i, the Club shall have the right by written
notice to the Player at said address to renew this contract for the period of one year on
the same terms, except that the amount payable to the player shall be such as the
Club shall fix in said notice; provided, however, that said amount, if fixed by a Major
League Club, shall be an amount payable at a rate not less than 75% of the-rate
stipulated for the preceding year.
(b) The Club's right to renew this contract, as provided in subparagraph (a) of this
paragraph io, and the promise of the Player not to play otherwise than with the Club
have been taken into consideration in determining the amount payable under paragraph 2 hereof.
It is in the use of the clause just quoted that Judge Frank found "virtual
slavery"; 8 z yet in that clause lies the secret of baseball's successful operation year after year. Upon the proposition that the "reserve clause" is absolutely necessary to baseball, the officials, owners and players are in total
agreement. In their brief the defendants in the Gardella case said: "The
restraint of which the plaintiff here complains, namely, the reserve clause
and the Commissioner's disciplinary power, are the very heart of the system of self-regulation by which Baseball has preserved the competition
'
and integrity which are the public's principal concern."S2
The players in whose contracts the "reserve clause" appears are even
more positive. The Committee on Labor and Industries of the Massachusetts Legislature recently held hearings on a bill8 3 to outlaw the ".reserve
clause" in baseball player contracts. John Murphy, a pitcher for the New
York Yankees, who had been elected by the players on the eight teams in
the American League as their spokesman, and Dixie Walker, an outfielder
for the Pittsburgh Pirates, similarly elected as spokesman for the players
in the National League, appeared at the hearing. Murphy advised the
Committee of a meeting held to discuss the "reserve clause" by represen81Gardella v. Chandler,
8Appellee's

8

172

F. 2d 402, 410 (1949).

Brief, p. 30.

3Massachusetts Legislature, House Bill No. 1636 (1948).
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tatives of the players from each team in the American League. His testimony was:
We knew what it [the reserve clause] meant. It simply means that at the end of the
year, or the following spring the ball dub owners have the right to resume their option
on our services. We spoke as informally as that in our meeting, and we said that is the
only way baseball can continue; that if our livelihood is to continue, we have to have
that in our contract, as an integral part of the contract, because without that clause if
a ball player were free to sign up with anybody whom he pleases at the end of that
year or the next spring, why, the whole structure of the game would be destroyed .... 84
Dixie Walker reported that he had been a player in "organized baseball"
for twenty years and had "never heard any of the ball players who have
said that they were anxious to have that [reserve] clause stricken out."
Walker affirmed John Murphy's testimony, adding that "the ballplayers
felt that it [the reserve clause] should be left as it was, because it was the
very backbone of the game."5 s
The minor leagues, as well as the majors, benefit from and are dependent on the "reserve clause." A substantial percentage of the teams in the
minors have direct identity with major league teams either by ownership
or "working agreements" under the "farm system." That system gives an
associated team the benefit of the financial stability of its parent dub, the
advantage of its scouting system and, most important, the use of its personnel in training and developing young players. The accomplished result
has been more teams in the minors, hence, more communities with baseball, more players gainfully employed and more quickly trained for participation in the major leagues. Without the "reserve clause" and the attendant right to claim a player's services as he is thus trained, no major
league team would undertake the considerable expense required to operate
a farm system.
The "reserve clause" is designed to prevent raids by wealthy dubs upon
the players of poorer members of the league, thereby preserving more
equal competition from year to year and maintaining more stable identity
of players with clubs and the baseball fans of their communities. As the
Court of Appeals in the Federalcase said, ".... [I]f the reserve clause did
not exist, the highly skillful players would be absorbed by the more
wealthy dubs, and thus some dubs in the league would so far outstrip
8

4Hearing, Committee on Labor and Industries, Massachusetts Legislature, January

22,

1948.

8s Ibid. George "Birdie" Tebbetts of the Boston Red Sox appeared, as well, and told the
committee, "I am a baseball player and I have no connection with management, and I have
no sympathy with them.... However, there is no reason that I can see why this bill [outlawing the "reserve clause"] should go through, because if it does it will absolutely ruin the
baseball players. It will deprive fellows like me of a tremendous earning power in baseball."
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others in playing ability that the contest between the superior and inferior
clubs could be uninteresting, and the public would refuse to patronize
them." 86
Theoretically, except for the seventy-five percent proviso, the "reserve
clause" gives the player no alternative to a grossly inadequate salary.In
practice that has never been the case. Efforts to produce "awful examples
of the operation of the reserve clause" during the trial of the Federal case
were unavailing.87 It is unlikely that any will be produced at the trial of
the pending actions. The average age of the players in the National
League at the beginning of the 1949 playing season was 27.31 years;8 8 the
average salary for the five and one-half months' season was approximately
$12,000.

The reason for lack of abuse of the "reserve clause" lies in the nature of
the game more than in the "benevolent" aspects of the baseball "dictatorship." 89 There is always a shortage of capable players; the threat of voluntary retirement is efficacious. More than that, esprit de corps, possible
only with salary-satisfied players, is essential to a winning team. As some
evidence of the success of baseball's "collective bargaining" stands the
fact that at the commencement of the 1949 season there were no "hold
outs" among the more than 6oo major league players, a situation which is
more the rule than the exception. Dictates of competition on the
playing field prohibit abuse of the "reserve clause."
VIII. PowER To TRADE
The second feature of the player's contract which will be given attention
upon the trial of the pending cases is the right given the dub to assign a
player's contract. In order, in fact, to prohibit a monopoly such as the
pending cases allege, each club in the major leagues is restricted to a
86National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
269 Fed. 681, 687 (1920).
87Brief on Behalf of Defendants in Error, p. 14.
88
NATIONAL LEAGUE AVERAGE AGES AS OF MARCH 1, x949

Infielders

Outfielders

Pitchers

Team

Brooklyn .......... 26.45
Philadelphia ....... 27.17
New York ......... 29.90
Chicago ........... 24.86
5.Boston ............ 29.90
26.40
6. Cincinnati .........
7. St. Louis .......... 27-99
8. Pittsburgh ........ 27.51

26.23
27.61
28.38
26.52
28.31
27.56
27.03
28.46

26.15
24.77
26.42
26. 37
28.97
27.52
27.03
28.67

26.22
27.06
26.x5
28.75
25.78
27-51
27.65
29.58

26.22
26.77
27.25
27.28
27.31
27-35
27.40
28.93

League ........... 27.35

27.49

27.0

27.35

27-3

Catchers
x.
2.
3.
4.

89 Compare Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F. 2d 402, 415 (C.A. 2d, 1949).
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player roster of twenty-five men. Because of this limit, however, it is necessary to the game and to the welfare of the players that the clubs have the
right, by assignment, to exchange players skilled in the play of one position, but not needed or being used, for other players needed to strengthen
the team. The right of assignment is a valuable and necessary right in
management. The players agree:
That is another way of keeping competition in baseball. One dub will think they
have too many pitchers, and another dub has too many infielders, and the only way to
maintain a balance is for one dub to trade a pitcher for two infielders, or vice versa.
It is the structure of baseball. The fans love it and the players love it. In most cases
of trades of players, I would say nine out of ten times the player receives an increase in
salary when he is transferred from one dub to another, because the new owner wants a
satisfied ballplayer.... We knew that was part of our business of baseball as much as
balls and strikes, and we went right along with it.9o

"Baseball law" surrounds the right of assignment with specific protections in the players' interests. Under the "waiver system" it is impossible
to assign a player to a classification lower than he holds unless all other
teams of that classification claim no interest in his services. Similarly the
"selection system" allows a team of higher classification to force the assignment of a player's contract against the will of his club, thereby assuring that a capable player will not get lost in the minor leagues.
The assignment of rights to personal services often presents troublesome
aspects. The Uniform Player's Contract anticipates and provides for that
right. 9' Williston in his work on Contracts says, "Rights which would not
90John Murphy's testimony before Committee on Labor and Industries, Massachusetts
Legislature, January 22, 1948.
9zThe Uniform Player's Contract provides:
"6. (a) The Player agrees that this contract may be assigned by the Club (and reassigned
by any assignee Club) to any other club in accordance with the Major and Major-Minor League
Rules.
"(b) The amount stated in paragraph 2 hereof which is payable to the Player for the period stated in paragraph ihereof shall not be diminished by any such assignment, except for
failure to report as provided in the next sub-paragraph (c).
"(c) The Player shall report to the assignee Club promptly (as provided in the Regulations)
upon receipt of written notice from the Club of the assignment of this contract. If the Player
fails so to report, he shall not be entitled to any payment for the period from the date he receives written notice of assignment until he reports to the assignee Club.
"(d) Upon and after such assignment, all rights and obligations of the Assignor Club hereunder shall become the rights and obligations of the assignee Club; provided, however, that
(x) The assignee Club shall be liable to the Player for payments accruing only from the
date of assignment and shall not be liable (but the assignor Club shall remain liable) for payments accrued prior to that date.
(2) If at any time the assignee is a Major League Club, it shall be liable to pay the Player
at the full rate stipulated in paragraph 2 hereof for the remainder of the period stated in paragraph i hereof and all prior assignors and assignees shall be relieved of liability for any payment for such period.
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otherwise be capable of assignment because too personal in their character, and duties, the performance of which for a similar reason could not be
delegated, may be assigned or delegated if the contract so provides. .. "
And the author continues in the footnote: "Thus the contracts of professional ball players often contain provisions enabling a dub which has
employed a player to assign to another dub the right to his services. See
Griffin v. Brooklyn Ball Club, 68 App. D. 566, 73 N.Y.S. 864, aff'd.,
174 N.Y. 536; Baseball Players' Fraternity v. Boston, etc., Club, i66
"
App. D. 484, Ii N.Y.S. 557. 192
Were the "reserve clause" and the right to assign players' contracts
abolished, there would immediately be introduced incentives tending to
destroy the loyalty of players to their team, an element so important to
the integrity of the game. For instance, if a player knew he would be a
"free agent" at the end of a season he might be tempted to shop around
for next season's job and to relax his efforts if he thought he had made an
arrangement with another team. In the case of assignments, if the player
had the right to stipulate as to where and when he would be assigned, there
would be an incentive for a player to endeavor to make a deal for himself
during the season and to have divided loyalties which would inevitably
affect the quality of his play. There can be no doubt that the integrity of
the game and the public confidence in it would be adversely affected if
players became free to move from dub to dub at their own choice.
"Baseball law" and the Uniform Player's Contract, for which it provides, are designed solely for the production of baseball games and to preserve all aspects of the game's integrity. For the plaintiffs, Gardella,
Martin and Lanier, to prevail, it will be necessary for the court to find
such an arrangement unreasonable.93
(3) Unless the assignor and assignee clubs agree otherwise, if the assignee Club is a Minor
League Club, the assignee Club shall be liable only to pay the Player at the rate usually paid
by said assignee Club to other players of similar skill and ability in its classification and the
assignor Club shall be liable to pay the difference for the remainder of the period stated in
paragraph i hereof between an amount computed at the rate stipulated in paragraph 2 hereof
and the amount so payable by the assignee Club.
"(e) In the event this contract is assigned by a Major League Club during the playing season, the assignor Club shall pay the Player his reasonable and actual moving expenses resulting from such assignment up to the sum of $5oo.
"(f) All references in other paragraphs of this contract to "the Club" shall be deemed to
mean and include any assignee of this contract."
922 Williston, Contracts § 423 (1936).
93In his complaint Gardella alleged:
"72. That the defendants are utilizing the 'reserve clause,' the standard Minor League con-

tract, the Major League Agreement, the Major League Rules, the Major-Minor League Agreement and the Minor League Rules, contrary to the settled principles of equity and common
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IX. AND NOT BASEBALL AONE

It may be obvious without comment that "organized baseball" is not
alone on the execution block. All professional sports, because of the problems common to all, have adopted systems similar to that under which "organized baseball" operates. Another observation, which may be categorized as a reductio ad absurdum but which nonetheless is compelled by
consideration of this subject, is the effect on college football of a final decision that baseball does violate the anti-trust laws. The production of football, at least by the larger universities, is strikingly similar to that of
"organized baseball." Teams cross state lines, they carry paraphernalia
with them, admissions are charged the spectators, the games result in
profit for the sponsoring universities, "scholarships" make participation
"attractive" for the players, and the games are broadcast and televised by
interstate facilities. More than that, practically every university in the
country, to prevent "jumping" and "raids on its players," enforces the
"one-year rule" under which a player, having played for a university, is
deprived of the opportunity of playing football the succeeding year if he
transfers to another university. Percentagewise his loss of one of three
years is strikingly similar to Gardella's loss of five years out of an expected
playing life of fifteen years. Can it be said that the application of the
"one-year rule" has not "deprived such a player of his occupation?" Is
every university president whose institution subscribes to and enforces the
law, and to monopolize or attempt to monopolize trade or commerce among the several states
and with foreign nations contrary to Section 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (15 U.S.C.A.,
Sec. 2) and to Section x3 of the Clayton Act (iS U.S.C.A., Sec. 13)." In answer the American
League replied, in part:
"Further answering paragraph 72, defendant alleges: The form of the player contract, the
Major League Agreement, the Major League Rules, the Major-Minor League Agreement and
the Minor League Rules have evolved naturally and progressively to meet the unique conditions necessarily inherent in a sport in which contests can only be played between independent
competing teams. The form of said contract provisions, agreements and rules has evolved and
has been determined by what was reasonable and necessary from time to time, to promote
the highest degree of competition between teams and to safeguard and preserve the integrity
of the game and the conditions under which it is played. The overall objects and purposes of
the contract provisions, agreements and rules are, and have been, to perpetuate baseball as
the national game of the United States, to surround it with the safeguards necessary to warrant the highest public confidence in its integrity and in the manner In which the game is
played and to provide uniform rules and regulations for umpiring, scoring and other matters
involved in the playing of the game. These objectives were and are beneficial to, and necessary
for the protection of, the proper interests of the players, the Clubs and the public in the game.
The contract provisions, agreements and rules are both reasonable and essential to protect and
preserve the respective interests of the players, the Clubs and the Public in the game and to
preserve the existence of the game itself. Experience has demonstrated that such contracts,
agreements, rules and regulations operate, and have operated, with great benefit to the public
interest in the national game of baseball and that their prohibition would not only unjustifiably
injure the interests of players and Clubs but also would irreparably injure the public."

78

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

((one-year rule" guilty of a misdemeanor and liable, under the Sherman
Act, to a fine of $5,ooo and one year's imprisonment?
A decision by the United States Supreme Court reversing its ruling in
the Federalcase and finding that "organized baseball" is "interstate trade
or commerce," its restraints unreasonable, and therefore in conflict with the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, would have a profound effect upon organized
sports in this country. It is a fairly standard technique for each industry
when first charged with violating the anti-trust laws to respond with the
cry that only ruin to that industry lies in an application of the anti-trust
laws to its particular restraints. The frequent use of that assertion, however, does not deny its validity respecting any particular set of facts. It is
the serious judgment of both management and players that a finding that
the operation of "organized baseball" violates the anti-trust laws would
mean the end of baseball as we know it. Such a consequence will not be
taken lightly by any court.
It is difficult to conceive a rationale upon which a decision compelling
that result might be based. Overruling the Federal case would assuredly
not serve the ends of social justice. In opposition to the interests of three
young men who consciously breached their contracts and deliberately and
knowingly subjected themselves to the prescribed penalty for such action
are the interests of those representing the ownership of baseball, the
thousands of players who each year realize a substantial and often extraordinary income from their playing efforts, and, of paramount importance,
the interest of a sports-loving public which has through its emotional and
monetary support made baseball the "National Game."

